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Executive Summary 
 
This report argues in favour of an economics-based approach to Article 82, in a way similar to 
the reform of Article 81 and merger control. In particular, we support an effects-based rather 
than a form-based approach to competition policy. Such an approach focuses on the presence 
of anti-competitive effects that harm consumers, and is based on the examination of each 
specific case, based on sound economics and grounded on facts.  
 
 
Why do we need an economic approach? 
 
An economic approach to Article 82 focuses on improved consumer welfare. In so doing, 
avoids confusing the protection of competition with the protection of competitors and it 
stresses that the ultimate yardstick of competition policy is in the satisfaction of consumer 
needs. Competition is a process that forces firms to be responsive to consumers’ needs with 
respect to price, quality, variety, etc.; over time it also acts as a selection mechanism, with 
more efficient firms replacing less efficient ones. Competition is therefore a key element in 
the promotion of a faster growing, consumer-oriented and more competitive European 
economy. 
 
An economics-based approach requires a careful examination of how competition works in 
each particular market in order to evaluate how specific company strategies affect consumer 
welfare. Indeed, an economic approach achieves two complementary goals. First, it ensures 
that anti-competitive behaviour does not outwit legal provisions. By focusing on the effects of 
company actions rather than on the form that these actions may take, an economics-based 
approach makes it more difficult for companies to circumvent competition policy constraints 
by way of attempting to achieve the same end results through the use of different commercial 
practices. At the same time, this approach provides a more consistent treatment of practices, 
since any specific practice is assessed in terms of its outcome and two practices leading to the 
same result will therefore be subject to a comparable treatment. 
 
Second, the economics-based approach guarantees that the statutory provisions do not unduly 
thwart pro-competitive strategies. An effects-based analysis takes fully into consideration the 
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fact that many business practices may have different effects in different circumstances: 
distorting competition in some cases and promoting efficiencies and innovation in others. A 
competition policy approach that directly confronts this duality will ensure that consumers are 
protected (through the prevention of behaviour that harms them) while promoting overall 
increased productivity and growth (since firms will not be discouraged in their search for 
efficiency). 
 
 
What are the implications of an economic approach?  
 
An economics-based approach to the application of article 82 implies that the assessment of 
each specific case will not be undertaken on the basis of the form that a particular business 
practice takes (for example, exclusive dealing, tying, etc.) but rather will be based on the 
assessment of the anti-competitive effects generated by business behaviour. This implies that 
competition authorities will need to identify a competitive harm, and assess the extent to 
which such a negative effect on consumers is potentially outweighed by efficiency gains. The 
identification of competitive harm requires spelling out a consistent business behaviour based 
on sound economics and supported by facts and empirical evidence. Similarly, efficiencies –
and how they are passed on to consumers– should be properly justified on the basis of 
economic analysis and grounded on the facts of each case.  
 
An economics-based approach will naturally lend itself to a “rule of reason” approach to 
competition policy, since careful consideration of the specifics of each case is needed, and 
this is likely to be especially difficult under “per se” rules. At the same time, we should not 
fall into the trap of active intervention and fine-tuning; whenever possible, competition is to 
be preferred to detailed regulation as the best mechanism to avoid inefficiencies and foster 
productivity and growth; this calls for a “non-dirigiste” approach to competition policy that 
focuses in most cases on entry barriers; in the context of Article 82, it is then natural to focus 
on competitive harm that arises from exclusionary strategies –possible exceptions concern 
some natural monopoly industries which may require ongoing supervision of access prices 
and conditions by regulatory agencies. Without trying to be exhaustive, the report discusses 
well-identified exclusionary strategies and the practices that they involve. 
 
 4
What are the consequences for procedure and the predictability of competition policy? 
 
In terms of procedure, the economic approach implies that there is no need to establish a 
preliminary and separate assessment of dominance. Rather, the emphasis is on the 
establishment of a verifiable and consistent account of significant competitive harm, since 
such an anti-competitive effect is what really matters and is already proof of dominance. In an 
effects-based approach, the focus is on the use of well-established economic analysis. Such a 
conceptual framework provides a benchmark for the detailed assessment of the key 
ingredients that have to be present in a case, whether one tries to check the presence of 
significant competitive harm, or the achievement of relevant economic efficiencies. 
 
This approach has also natural implications in terms of the burden of proof in specific cases. 
Competition authorities have to show the presence of significant anti-competitive harm, while 
the dominant firm should bear the burden of establishing credible efficiency arguments.  
 
Requiring consistent economic arguments, grounded on established facts, may be perceived as 
constraining somewhat the competition authority’ leeway. It is however necessary to ensure a 
consistent treatment of the various practices that can serve the same anticompetitive effect. It 
also contributes to enhance the predictability and, consequently, the effectiveness of 
competition policy enforcement. Indeed, under a form-based approach predictability need not 
be higher (as the Michelin saga shows), and sometimes the predictability inherent to “ex-ante” 
prohibitions may in fact be a straightjacket for business, preventing innovation and economic 
growth. 
 
Overall, we believe that the economics-based approach presented in this report is a step in the 
right direction: focused on consumers’ needs and the promotion of economic growth, and 
consistent with the reforms of article 81 and merger control. It is not a question of having 
more or less intervention, but of more effective intervention. The goal is to focus on the 
important competitive harms, while preserving and encouraging efficiency. The economic 
approach to article 82 provides a flexible framework that fosters increased productivity and 
growth to the benefits of consumers. 
 5
Chapter I: General principles
 
 
Section 1: Effects-based versus form-based approach 
 
European competition policy has recently been reformed and is now following a more 
economics-based approach in the implementation of Article 81 on anticompetitive agreements 
and in merger control; we will argue here in favour of a similar move for the enforcement of 
Article 82 on abuses of dominance. In particular, we will argue that the competition authority 
should adopt an effects-based rather than a form-based approach to competition policy. In this 
chapter we first review the net benefits of such a move, and then make a few remarks on how 
to implement it.1  
 
The discussion and management of Article 82 cases are often organized by categories of 
conduct, such as predatory pricing, discrimination, fidelity rebates or tying. However, such a 
form-based approach is problematic. In many instances alternative practices can serve the 
same purpose. For example, predatory pricing can take the form of selective rebates, targeted 
at the rival’s prospective customers. Alternatively, the predator can engage in explicit 
discrimination and charge more attractive prices or, more generally, offer better conditions to 
these customers. Other instruments in the predator’s toolbox include implicit discrimination 
(e.g. in the form of fidelity or quantitative rebates that are formally available to all, but in fact 
tailored to the specific needs of the targeted customers) and mixed bundling or tying, when 
these customers are particularly interested in the bundle in question. To take another example, 
a firm that controls a key input may distort competition in a downstream market by refusing 
to deal with independent downstream firms; alternatively, it can engage in exclusive dealing 
arrangements or engage in explicit or implicit price discrimination such as mentioned above; 
yet other instruments include specific (in-)compatibility choices, physical or commercial 
tying, and so forth.  
 
                                                 
1 Vickers, J. (2004), Abuse of Market Power, The Economic Journal, 115 (June): F244–F261, offers a detailed 
discussion of enforcement issues.  
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A more consistent approach would start out from the effects of anticompetitive conduct, such 
as exclusion of competitors in the same market or in a horizontally or vertically related market 
one, and consider the competitive harm that is inflicted on consumers. Adopting such an 
effects-based approach would ensure that these various practices are treated consistently when 
they are adopted for the same purpose. In contrast, a form-based approach creates the risk that 
they will be treated inconsistently, with some practices possibly enjoying a relatively more 
lenient attitude (e.g., because of different standards). Arbitraging among these different 
treatments may facilitate exclusion, or induce the dominant firm to adopt alternative 
exclusionary methods, which may well inflict a higher cost on consumers.  
 
For example, in the context of predation, tight rules against predatory pricing may lead the 
predator to offer better terms in other dimensions. It may be less likely that these better terms  
are passed on to final consumers. Final consumers then will no longer benefit from low prices 
in the short-run, and yet this alternative strategy may still have similar exclusionary effects in 
the long-run. Similarly, in the context of vertical foreclosure, banning discrimination may lead 
the bottleneck owner to refuse to deal with any independent downstream competitor – which 
may well be interpreted as a more extreme form of discrimination; by this decision, however, 
the dominant firm gives up somewhat on product diversity. This reduces its profitability but 
also hurts consumers.  
 
While alternative practices can serve the same purpose in given circumstances, the same 
practice can also have either pro- or anticompetitive effects, depending on the circumstances. 
To take a simple example, low prices are at the heart of a desirable competitive process. And 
in some cases (introductory pricing, economies of scale and scope, learning-by-doing, 
network effects), even prices that are below cost for some period constitute “normal” 
competitive prices. But it is also true that in specific circumstances, low prices (even above 
cost) can have an exclusionary effect and harm consumers in the medium- to long-run. There 
again, focussing on effects, as opposed to form, is key to an effective competition policy. 
 
Whether we consider an effects-based or a form-based approach, in the enforcement of 
competition policy, one can opt for per se rules, i.e., an ex-ante description of what is banned, 
or for a rule of reason, i.e. an ex-post overall evaluation of the different consequences. In an 
effects-based approach a per se rule for “financial predation”, for example, would be 
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“whenever you have a financially strong incumbent/financially weak entrant, the incumbent 
cannot ‘invest  in losses’ beyond a certain threshold (to be defined with reference to possible 
practices),”; in contrast, a form-based per se approach to “predatory pricing” would  prescribe 
that “the incumbent cannot lower its price below a certain threshold.” That is, even when 
implemented as a per se rule, an effects-based approach includes more than a single practice 
(low pricing, high advertising, and so forth) and requires a richer description of the 
circumstances (financial conditions of the incumbent and the competitor) than  a form-based 
approach. In both cases, however, the competition authority must balance the likelihood of 
false positives (condemning a pro-competitive practice in a particular case) and false 
negatives (allowing a dominant firm to abuse its market power in other cases), as well as the 
likely magnitudes of the costs for competition of both types of errors. Thus, if, for example, a 
per se approach were to be adopted, the per se rule should be a systematic ban only if the 
expected cost of false negatives is perceived to dominate. The economic approach highlighted 
below suggests however that in general both types of errors are  likely, and that they can be 
much more accurately assessed when taking into account the specific circumstances of a case. 
This therefore provides a strong argument in favour of a rule of reason. Still, the standard and 
the process adopted should be designed to balance these two types of errors; for example, if  
the cost of false negatives is expected to be higher, then the balance should be tilted towards 
plaintiffs and against dominant firms. In a form-based approach, however, this balancing 
would be done for each practice. This could indeed lead to an inconsistent treatment of 
alternative practices, even though they may be used for the same purpose. In contrast, in an 
effects-based approach the balance would be made according to the type of anticompetitive 
harm that is at stake. This would not only ensure that treatment is more consistent, but it 
would also focus the attention and the scarce resources of competition authorities on those 
cases where competitive harm is likely to be important.  
 
 
Section 2: Objectives 
 
a) Consumers matter 
 
In the preceding account of competition policy, we have asked that the competition authority 
start by identifying the competitive harm that is involved in the case under review. This begs 
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the question of what is to be meant by “competitive harm”. This question in turn is linked to 
the question of what are the objectives of competition policy. In one tradition the objective of 
competition policy is defined as the protection of competition.2 This formula as such is not 
very helpful because it raises the further question of the standards by which the competition 
authority is to assess a given type of conduct in practice. If a particular type of conduct 
permits a company to succeed and to displace its competitors in the market, by what standard 
should the competition authority assess whether the conduct in question is detrimental to 
“competition” or whether the conduct in question is legitimate and its prohibition by the 
authority would be detrimental to “competition”? Ultimately, the assessment of competitive 
harm must be based on an assessment of how competition in the particular market works and 
what the practice in question means for market participants.  
 
The standard for assessing whether a given practice is detrimental to “competition” or 
whether it is a legitimate tool of “competition” should be derived from the effects of the 
practice on consumers. If we think of “competition” as a regime in which the different 
suppliers contend to sell their products to participants on the other side of the market, then the 
benefits reaped by the other side of the market will themselves provide a measure of how well 
“competition” works. For final-products markets, this observation leads directly to a 
consumer welfare standard. For primary- or intermediate-products markets, a consumer 
welfare standard is obtained by adding the observation that the vertical organization of 
industry itself is a subject of “competition” the ultimate beneficiaries of which are the final 
consumers. In either case, competition forces the supply side of the economy to be responsive 
to consumers’ needs with respect to price, quality, variety, etc.; business strategies that 
respond to these needs and raise consumer welfare are likely to be legitimate competitive 
strategies.  The observation of such a strategy in the market provides prima facie evidence of 
the importance of competition. In contrast, a lowering of consumer welfare provides evidence 
of competitive harm. 
 
If the assessment of competitive harm and the protection of “competition” are assessed with 
reference to consumer welfare, it is incumbent upon the competition authority in each case to 
examine the actual working of competition in the particular market without prejudice and to 
                                                 
2 Thus, in its XXIX Report on Competition Policy (2000, p. 6), the European Commission writes “The first 
objective of competition policy is the maintenance of competitive markets.” 
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explain the harm for consumers from the practice in question. Without the discipline provided 
by this routine, the authority may be tempted to identify the “protection of competition” with 
the preservation of a particular market structure, e.g., one that involves actual competition by 
a given company. Its policy intervention may then merely have the effect of protecting the 
other companies in the market from competition. This would enable them to maintain their 
presence in the market even though their offerings do not provide consumers with the best 
choices in terms of prices, quality, or variety.3  
 
In some cases, concerns for the protection of competitors from certain forms of inappropriate 
behaviour may be appropriate. However, this is certainly not true for all cases; moreover, 
competitors themselves should not be protected from competition by the authority’s 
intervention. In each case, the competition authority must assess these matters without 
prejudice for any particular structure. A consumer welfare standard in the context of an 
effects-based approach provides a suitable criterion for distinction. Referring to this standard 
is all the more important because, in the actual proceedings on a given case, competitors are 
usually much better organized than consumers. The competition authority receives more 
complaints and more material from competitors, so the procedure tends to be biased towards 
the protection of competitors. Developing a routine for assessing consumer welfare effects 
provides a counterweight to this bias. 
 
 
b) Tradeoffs, Proxies, and the Need for a Non-Dirigiste Approach 
 
The use of the single term “consumer welfare” conceals the fact that we are really talking 
about a multi-facetted concern. Many issues concern multiple markets, with consumer welfare 
effects going in different directions in the different markets. In many cases, it is also 
necessary to think about consumer welfare in the future, as well as consumer welfare today.  
 
In such cases, the competition authority needs to take a comprehensive view, taking account 
of the different effects of the practices under investigation and of policy interventions on 
consumer welfare. In particular, it must allow for long-term, as well as short-term effects, and 
                                                 
3 Thus, in the Lufthansa-Germania predatory pricing case, in November 2001, the Bundeskartellamt required 
Lufthansa to keep its price on the Düsseldorf-Berlin route at least 35 Euro above the price of 99 Euro at which 
the competing carrier Germania claimed to be covering its costs. The difference was deemed to reflect the costs 
of services provided by Lufthansa, but not by Germania.  The relation of the base price of 99 Euro to Lufthansa’s 
costs was not considered (though Lufthansa’s claims in other cases suggest that the costs were higher). 
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for repercussions on neighbouring markets, as well as the markets under direct consideration. 
A neglect of longer-term effects or indirect effects is not justified by the fact that these effects 
are more uncertain and more difficult to assess.   
 
In considering consumer welfare effects in multiple, present, and future markets, one usually 
faces tradeoffs. In some cases, the markets themselves provide information about the 
appropriate weights to be attached to the different effects, e.g. discount factors for weighing 
future as opposed to present effects. In many cases though, the tradeoffs involve an element of 
redistribution between groups of consumers. For such redistribution, market data – or indeed 
any other data – do not provide “objective” guidance. When faced with such tradeoffs, the 
competition authority must exercise its judgement, which necessarily involves a certain 
element of subjectivity. However, acknowledging that there is room for a certain element of 
subjectivity in taking choices concerning tradeoffs does not absolve the competition authority 
from the requirement to be clear about the tradeoffs themselves and to indicate  precisely what 
consumer welfare effects are relevant to its decision.  
 
In focussing on consumer welfare, one must not fall into the trap of seeing competition policy 
as a tool of active policy intervention designed to correct the inefficiencies associated with 
monopolies and oligopolies so as to maximize some measure of welfare. Competition policy 
is based on the principle that competition itself is the best mechanism for avoiding 
inefficiencies, so the competition authority should not try to let its own intervention replace 
the role of competition in the market place. The powers given to the competition authority are, 
with very few exceptions, powers to prohibit certain behaviours and certain developments, not 
powers to actively determine where the market participants should be going. The authority 
can ban certain agreements, certain practices and certain mergers, but it should not tell the 
markets participants what they should do instead.  
 
As an illustration of these considerations, consider the problem of monopoly pricing. One 
response to the problem might be for the competition authority to intervene, citing excessive 
pricing by a monopolist as an infraction of the abuse-of-dominance prohibition in Article 82 
of the Treaty. Another response might be to leave the matter alone, hoping that the profits that 
the monopolist earns will spur innovation or imitation and entry into the market, so that, 
eventually, the problem will be solved by competition.  
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 The choice between these two alternative responses to the problem of monopoly pricing 
involves a choice among competition policy regimes, as well as an intertemporal tradeoff. If it 
was just a question of short-run versus long-run effects, one might be tempted to put the 
immediate gain of today’s consumers above everything else. However, a policy intervention 
on such grounds requires the competition authority to actually determine what price it 
considers appropriate, as well as how it should evolve over time; for this it is not really 
qualified. Moreover, such a policy intervention drastically reduces, and may even forego  the 
chance to  protect consumers in the future  by competition rather than policy intervention. A 
regime in which consumer protection from monopoly abuses is based on competition is 
greatly to be preferred to one in which consumer protection is due to political or 
administrative control of prices. In most circumstances therefore, the competition authority 
ought to refrain from intervening against monopolistic pricing and instead see to it that there 
is room for competition to open up.  
 
Exceptions to this recommendation tend to involve monopolies that own essential facilities 
such as transmission and distribution grids in electricity, whose reduplication is technically 
infeasible or economically undesirable. Policy intervention to control the use of monopoly 
power derived from such facilities can be desirable, particularly as a tool for enhancing 
competition in activities such as the generation and sale of electricity, which are not 
themselves “natural monopolies”, but require access to the essential facilities. However,  in 
designing the appropriate rules for access provision and for the pricing of such facilities, one 
must provide for ongoing supervision. This falls outside the scope of traditional competition 
policy and is best left to specialized regulatory authorities. By no means should the 
justifiability of a dirigiste approach for some essential facilities become a paradigm for 
competition policy itself.  
 
In assessing the implications of alternative policies for the future, one difficulty is that their 
effects on future market outcomes are difficult to  predict. Trying to foresee the different 
possibilities is sometimes quite hopeless, especially if one takes into account that the genius 
of competitive markets lies precisely in developing possibilities that no one has thought about 
before. Given this difficulty, it is sometimes necessary to forego an explicit computation of 
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consumer welfare in future markets and to rely on a proxy instead. Such a proxy may usefully 
refer to aspects of market structure.  
 
Thus in the preceding discussion of the monopoly problem, a structure in which the policy 
authority foregoes any attempt to control monopoly pricing, but other suppliers are free to 
enter the market was deemed superior in most cases to a structure involving policy control of 
monopoly pricing and reduced entry incentives. This judgement is based on broad patterns of 
experience concerning the implications of the two alternatives in a variety of markets rather 
than any attempt at making precise predictions for the market under consideration. As such, it 
conforms to the anti-dirigiste approach to competition policy. 
 
In the monopoly example, the use of structural aspects of the market, namely the freedom of 
entry and the prospect of future competition, as a proxy for the explicit assessment of 
consumer welfare effects in future markets serves to caution the competition authority about 
the dangers of intervention. In other examples, e.g., in cases involving market foreclosure, the 
use of such a proxy can also work in the opposite direction and call for a policy intervention 
designed to prohibit exclusionary practices and to keep markets open for competition. The 
structural aspects of markets that need to be taken into account encompass traditional notions 
of market structure, but extend far beyond them, including, in particular, the potential for 
entry by new competitors. In each case, the competition authority must give a clear account of 
(i)  the precise material justification for treating the structural effects in question as a proxy 
for future consumer welfare effects and (ii) the precise way the business practice under 
investigation affects the scope for current and future competition. Particular attention must be 
paid to exclusionary effects restricting the scope for new entry. Competitive harms from 
exclusionary effects are discussed in detail below. However, there should be no prior 
presumption that the current market structure and the current competitors are the guarantors of 
competition, which will enhance consumer welfare in markets in the future.  
 
 
Section 3: Procedure 
 
Moving from a form-based to an effects-based approach has important implications for 
procedure. Whereas under a form-based approach, it is enough to verify (i) that a firm is 
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dominant and (ii) that a certain form of behaviour is practiced, an effects-based approach 
requires the verification of competitive harm.  
 
In the first place, in deciding to bring a case, the competition authority should therefore focus 
on identifying the competitive harm of concern. To do so, the authority must analyse the 
practice in question to see whether there is a consistent and verifiable economic account of 
significant competitive harm. The account should be both based on sound economic analysis 
and grounded on facts. In particular, since many practices can have pro- as well as 
anticompetitive effects, merely alluding to the possibility of a story is not sufficient. The 
required ingredients of the story must therefore be properly spelled out and shown to be 
present. At the same time, the authority must check to see whether the practice in question 
cannot also be justified as a legitimate mode of competitive behaviour. If several 
interpretations are possible, the authority must investigate whether the data permit a 
distinction as to which of the different interpretations apply.  
 
In asking for an account that is based on sound economic analysis and grounded on facts, we 
are not asking for an account that embeds the case under review into a single, encompassing 
formal model. Formal models are designed to verify the consistency of arguments about one 
particular effect and to gain an idea about the empirical data one needs in order to assess the 
relevance this effect in a given case. In any given case in practice, however, one may have to 
examine several effects at once; in this situation, an encompassing formal analysis may not be 
feasible. However, for each particular effect that is considered, the arguments that are made 
should be grounded in formal analysis. At this level the analysis should rely on models as 
tools to assess the validity of the argument – in its relation to the facts, as well as internal 
consistency, and consistency with the other arguments that are given.  Where empirical 
information points to effects that have not yet been studied in the literature, it may be 
necessary to develop a model from scratch, relying on standard methods. However, the less a 
given effect has been scrutinized in theoretical and empirical research, the more cautious the 
authority should be in relying on it for  the account which it gives.  
 
Requiring this first step may be perceived as constraining somewhat the competition 
authority’s leeway. It is however necessary to ensure the consistency of the treatment of the 
various practices that can serve the same anticompetitive effect. It also contributes to 
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enhancing the predictability and, consequently, the effectiveness of competition policy 
enforcement. 
 
In contrast to a form-based approach, an effects-based approach needs to put less weight on a 
separate verification of dominance, except possibly for a de minimis consideration. If an 
effects-based approach yields a consistent and verifiable account of significant competitive 
harm, that in itself is evidence of dominance. Traditional modes of establishing “dominance” 
by recourse to information about market structure are merely proxies for a determination of 
“dominance” in any substantive sense, i.e., the ability to exert power and impose abusive 
behaviour on other market participants. If an effects-based approach provides evidence of an 
abuse which is only possible if the firm has a position of dominance, then no further separate 
demonstration of dominance should be needed – if no separate demonstration of dominance is 
provided, one may however require the abuse to be clearly established, with a high standard 
of proof 
 
Traditional considerations about the presence or absence of dominance do not therefore 
become moot. They merely become part of the procedure for establishing competitive harm 
by the practice under investigation. Thus, in a predation case, any account of the possibility of 
recouping current losses through future gains will have to involve some verification of the 
firm’s prospects for imposing and maintaining higher prices once the presumed predation has 
been successful. 
 
In proposing to reduce the role of separate assessments of dominance and to integrate the 
substantive assessment of dominance with the procedure for establishing competitive harm 
itself, we depart from the tradition of case law concerning Art. 82 of the Treaty, but not, we 
believe, from the legal norm itself. Art. 82 of the Treaty is concerned not just with dominance 
as such, but with abuses of dominance. The case law tradition of having separate assessments 
of dominance and of abusiveness of behaviour simplifies procedures, but this simplification 
involves a loss of precision in the implementation of the legal norm. The structural indicators 
which traditionally serve as proxies for “dominance” provide an appropriate measure of 
power in some markets, but not in others. In a market where these indicators do not properly 
measure the firm’s ability to impose abusive behaviour on others, the competition authority’s 
intervention under traditional modes of procedure is likely to be inappropriate, too harsh in 
 15
some cases and too lenient in others. Given that the Treaty itself does not provide a separate 
definition of dominance, let alone call for any of the traditionally used indicators as such, it 
seems more appropriate to have the implementation of the Treaty itself focus on the abuses 
and to treat the assessment of dominance in this context. 
 
Our proposed effect-based approach also allows us to capture in a balanced and meaningful 
way the notion of special responsibility of a dominant firm. The reference to such 
responsibility is often intended to prohibit some practices when exerted by a dominant firm, 
while considering them lawful if practiced by smaller competitors. Once we focus on the 
exclusionary effects of market practices, the notion of special responsibility naturally  
emerges from the analysis, in that certain practices are to be prohibited when they determine 
exclusionary effects, while they are lawful as long as no competitive harm is involved. Since 
in this analysis we do not need to assess the existence of dominance separately, the special 
responsibility implicitly applies to any conduct and firm that (is able to) interfere and distort 
the competitive process of entry into the market. 
   
Moving from a form-based to an effects-based approach will pose a challenge for court 
proceedings. A natural process would consist of asking the competition authority to first 
identify a consistent story of competitive harm, identifying the economic theory or theories on 
which the story is based, as well as the facts which support the theory as opposed to 
competing theories. Next, the firm should have the opportunity to present its defense, 
presumably to provide a counter-story indicating that the practice in question is not anti-
competitive, but is in fact a legitimate, perhaps even pro-competitive business practice. In the 
end, it will be up to the court to determine which story it considers to be the most plausible. 
 
Given the creativity of lawyers and economists in coming up with stories, the outcome of 
such proceedings can be very sensitive to how the burden of proof is allocated between the 
two parties. In line with the procedure sketched out above, the general rule should be that the 
antitrust authority bears the burden of proof for identifying and establishing anticompetitive 
effects. Two additional principles seem advisable: First, in the absence of additional evidence 
to the contrary, an argument based on established economic theory and supported by facts that 
according to the theory, are material to the assessment of the practice in question should be 
deemed more credible than a counterargument that does not have such a basis. For example, 
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in a case involving financial predation, it should be enough for the competition authority to 
establish the circumstances which, according to existing economic theory, can make financial 
predation viable without having to provide a more detailed account of the possibility of 
recoupment.4 Second, if the story of competitive harm that is brought forth by the competition 
authority fulfils the criteria listed above and the validity of the counter-story brought by the 
firm hinges on data in the domain of the firm, then it should be incumbent upon the firm to 
provide these data.  
 
Both of these principles require a certain degree of flexibility in the handling of proof 
requirements. However, this cannot be avoided if the effects-based approach is to be practical. 
Whereas a form-based approach hinges on data that the competition authority should in 
principle be able to provide, an effects-based approach also requires interpretations of data 
where discrimination is more difficult. Taking existing economic theory as a standard of 
reference removes some arbitrariness  from such an interpretation.  
 
The greater flexibility of an effects-based approach need not reduce the predictability of 
competition policy. To be sure, within a given tradition, a form-based approach may provide 
the competition authority as well as market participants with some guidance as to what forms 
of behaviour are acceptable and what forms are not. However, short of stipulating an 
exhaustive list of acceptable forms of behaviour, which would probably constitute an 
uncomfortable "straight jacket" that would impede economic progress and development, the 
case law will only determine a list of practices that are not acceptable. By nature, that list 
cannot be exhaustive: firms that want to purse a given purpose (be it pro- or anti-competitive) 
will always be tempted to adopt alternative practices that have not yet be formally banned, in 
which case they will expose themselves to some legal uncertainty -- as illustrated by the 
Michelin saga. In addition, if the presumptions arising from a form-based approach lead to 
rulings that run counter to the economics of the cases, they will kindle political resistance to 
competition policy. Political intervention may then take at least some competition policy 
decisions out of the rule of law. The results then would certainly be less predictable than those 
of an effects-based approach under the given legal norms.  
 
                                                 
4 On this point, see Bolton, P., J. Brodley and M. Riordan, 2000, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal 
Policy, Georgetown Law Review, 88: 2239-2330. 
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Moreover, without a common foundation in underlying principles, the presumptions as to 
what forms of behaviour are acceptable and what forms are not may differ from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, depending on each jurisdiction’s case law tradition. Such differences impair the 
predictability of competition policy across jurisdictions. In particular, they are likely to cause 
frictions in the newly decentralized application of Art. 82 under Regulation 01/2003. A 
common foundation in underlying principles based on economic theory can help to coordinate 
and focus the requisite adjustment process and improve the predictability of decentralized 
antitrust policy under the new Regulation. 
 
 
 
Chapter II: Competitive harms  
 
 
In an effects-based, non-dirigiste approach the analysis of competitive harms naturally 
focuses on keeping the competitive process open and avoiding the exclusion of actual or 
potential rivals from the market. In addition, by focussing on the impact of competition policy 
towards barriers to entry, such an approach guarantees an easier access to markets for new 
entrants; it therefore contributes to fostering the birth of new activities and firms, in line with 
the “Lisbon agenda”.  
 
In this perspective it seems useful to distinguish three broad typologies of exclusion that differ 
in respect to the market position of the firms involved and in respect to the specific features 
that characterize the exclusionary effects: Exclusion within the same market, where an 
incumbent forces the exit or prevents the entry of a competitor, exclusion in an adjacent 
market where the dominant firm excludes producers active in markets different but related to 
its main market, and exclusion in a vertically related market, where exclusion takes places in 
different stages of the production process. 
 
This chapter therefore presents a framework to deal with competitive harms, organizing 
exclusionary effects in the three classes distinguished above. Since a given type of exclusion 
can be implemented through different practices, our classification helps to maintain a 
consistent approach across practices, uniformly treating all the conduct that can be used to 
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reach a certain type of exclusion. In a given market situation under consideration, the same 
behaviour can be associated with pro-competitive explanations as well as with exclusionary 
rationales. In Chapter III we will therefore go through the traditional classification of 
practices and relate them to the three classes of exclusionary effects highlighted in this 
chapter as well as to their potential efficiency justifications.  
 
Our treatment is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Rather than considering all 
possible effects, abuses, and practices, let alone providing an in-depth analysis of each, we 
consider some of the most prominent instances in order to show how an effects-based 
approach makes a difference for competition analysis. Our objective is to elucidate basic 
principles. We do not try to translate these principles into operational procedures. To do so 
would require a more comprehensive, systematic and in-depth analysis of the different forms, 
effects and tradeoffs than we can present here. Presumably such an analysis – and the ensuing 
operationalization of the basic principles – will be provided when the Commission develops 
its guidelines for the treatment of abuses under Art. 82. 
 
 
Section 1: Exclusion within one market 
 
The first kind of competitive harm we consider is the exclusion of a competitor from the 
market in which the incumbent firm is primarily active. Exclusion can be intended in two 
different ways: the rival firm can be forced to exit, or alternatively it can refrain from entering 
the market. Moreover, this category of competitive harm also can include the case when a 
rival firm, in reaction to the strategies of the incumbent, adopts a passive behaviour and 
avoids competing fiercely.  
 
The Industrial Organization literature has analyzed a wide set of practices that are consistent 
with these exclusionary effects. These practices share many common features, which allow us 
to describe exclusion within one market in general terms.  
 
First, the anticompetitive strategies have a time dimension, and entail an aggressive phase 
followed by a recoupment period. During the initial phase, the incumbent adopts strategies 
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aimed at reducing the (actual or expected) profitability of the (actual or potential) competitor. 
For instance, it may  reduce the price (predatory pricing) or offer targeted rebates in order to 
reduce the rival’s demand and induce losses;5 by tying its products the incumbent  can prevent  
entry into the main market by competitors offering complementary products;6 the dominant 
firm can use exclusive dealing contracts to deter entry;7 it may choose a very high level of  
quality, or offer additional varieties (product proliferation), reducing the competitor’s demand 
or expected profits;8 it may over-invest in capacity, committing to a low price-high volume 
strategy;9 or it  may expand its advertising efforts, forcing the rival to increase its promotional 
expenditures as well.  
 
Although these conducts are focussed on reducing rivals’ profits, during this initial phase, in 
most cases, we also observe an adverse effect on the incumbent’s profits, and an improvement 
in consumer welfare. The reduction of the incumbent’s profits comes about due to a distortion 
in the strategies with respect to the case of normal oligopolistic competition, determining a 
suboptimal performance in the short-term. For the same reason, the short-term effect on 
consumers is usually positive, since the rivals’ demand and profits can only be reduced if  one 
offers more attractive terms to the customers. 
 
The longer-term effects of exclusionary behaviour move in the opposite direction: once the 
entrant has been forced to exit (or disciplined into assuming a passive role), or the potential 
entrant has been discouraged, the incumbent firm can exploit its increased market power 
recouping the initial losses, while worsening the conditions for consumers.  
 
The overall profitability of the exclusionary strategy hinges on the ability to get rid of the 
competitors and to prevent further entries into the market. This is difficult to assess both for 
the incumbent and for an antitrust authority. Antitrust cases involving exclusion can be 
                                                 
5 See Kreps D., and R. Wilson (1982), Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 27: 
253-79, and Milgrom P., and J. Roberts (1982), Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 27: 280-312. 
6 See Carlton D. W., and M. Waldman (2002), The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power 
in Evolving Industries, Rand Journal of Economics, 33: 194-220. 
7 See Aghion P., and P. Bolton (1987), Contracts as Barriers to Entry, American Economic Review, 77: 388-401.   
8 See Schmalensee R. (1982), Entry Deterrence in the Ready to Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, Bell Journal of 
Economics, 9: 305-27, Bonanno G. (1987), Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence, Review 
of Economic Studies, 54: 37-46, Judd K. (1985), Credible Spatial Preemption, Rand Journal of Economics, 16: 
153-166.. 
9 See Dixit A. (1980), The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence, Economic Journal, 90: 95-106. 
 20
opened at different stages of the abusive strategy, and the evidence collected might include 
only the initial phases of the process. In these cases the competitor, although suffering losses 
and tighter financial conditions, may still be in the market; and the incumbent has not yet 
begun to recoup his initial losses. When instead the case is opened after the exclusionary 
episode has occurred, evidence of actual exclusion and of a subsequent increase in prices can 
be collected. Hence, recoupment, although essential for the overall evaluation of exclusionary 
conduct, can be proved with  different mixtures of evidence and theoretical elements, 
depending on the case. 
 
Looking at the related literature, it is interesting for our discussion to focus here on three main 
scenarios of exclusion, which we may label as reputation, signal jamming and financial 
predation.10 Note that, while the rationale for exclusion differs in these three scenarios, many 
different strategic tools (e.g., pricing, advertising, product differentiation) can be used to 
implement any of them.  
 
The reputation approach hinges on the competitor’s lack of information about the incumbent’s 
incentives to adopt an aggressive market strategy. When the incumbent’s incentives are 
uncertain, the competitor’s beliefs play a crucial role in predicting the incumbent’s reactions 
and the profitability of entry. By reacting aggressively early on, the incumbent can then tilt 
the probability assessment of small or potential competitors (reputation), so as to prevent 
further entry or to induce exit; the incumbent’s profits in the long-run are consequently 
protected. Hence, even when the dominant firm would have incentives to adopt a less 
aggressive behaviour in the short-term, the recoupment opportunities offered by reputation 
can lead the incumbent to adopt an exclusionary strategy. 
 
A second setting where exclusion can be realized involves signal jamming. When small or 
new competitors have imperfect information on market profitability, a safe strategy would 
require selective entry into specific market segments. By testing the market the firm can reach 
a better local knowledge of demand in the neighbourhood of the prevailing prices. In such a 
situation, the incumbent can reduce its price, improve its quality or launch a local advertising 
campaign beyond the equilibrium level so as to prevent the competitor from learning the 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of predation scenarios based on this classification, see, for example Motta, M., (2004), 
Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 
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features of demand in the relevant conditions. Signal jamming can in this way allow the 
incumbent to delay or deter entry. 
 
Finally, financial predation can be achieved through many different practices that create the 
preconditions for a negative performance of the competitor. The traditional deep pocket 
theory of predation simply assumes that the incumbent firm has a financial advantage over the 
entrant, which allows it to afford the losses of a price war until the competitor is driven out of 
the market. Today, however, modern Industrial Organization theory  challenges this simplistic 
story, as it does not consider the possibility that an efficient competitor obtains external 
financing during the predation phase, restoring symmetry between the two firms and making 
predation unprofitable for the incumbent.11 A theory of financial predation, consequently, has 
to explain why this solution does not arise, invoking capital market imperfections that affect 
the relation between the entrant and its investors. Indeed, even if the incumbent does not make 
an exclusionary attack, the competitor has to rely on investors, who have a limited ability to 
monitor the firm’s effort, the risk taken, the private benefits extracted, and so forth. This is 
particular important if the competitor is a new firm. Hence, the financial contract has to 
provide incentives to induce the firm to repay the investors. Threatening to liquidate the firm 
or to deny loan extensions in case of insufficient performance are examples of such clauses. 
Unfortunately, financial contracts that are designed to alleviate agency problems also offer 
predation opportunities to the incumbent. Aggressive conduct that reduces the cash flow and 
the profits of the competitor will in fact tighten the conditions for its external finance, 
reducing the ability of the rival to sustain a prolonged price war.  On the other side of this 
dilemma, any attempt to reduce exposure to predation, for instance by ensuring finance to the 
competitor even if it performs poorly, would exacerbate the agency problems of the investor.     
 
We have to stress here that, in all the situations described above in which exclusion in one 
market might occur, most of the strategic variables - e.g., active pricing, product design and 
tying, exclusive dealing, capacity setting or advertising - that can support an exclusionary 
purpose can also be adopted when exclusion is not on the agenda and “normal” oligopolistic 
rivalry prevails. Hence pro-competitive and efficiency arguments can be potentially relevant 
                                                 
11 See for example Bolton, P,, and D. Scharfstein (1990), A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in 
Financial Contracting, American Economic Review, 80: 93-106. 
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in any situation involving these practices. For instance, a reduction in prices is a normal 
reaction to the entry of a competitor, and it can be part of a predatory strategy.  
 
We therefore need to carefully identify the precise story that is supposed to summarize the 
alleged abusive behaviour, and to compare it with possible alternative explanations, if there 
are any, that derive from a non-abusive oligopolistic practice. This exercise identifies the 
relevant elements and the facts that allow discrimination between the lawful and 
anticompetitive explanations in a given and specific situation.  
 
To illustrate this approach, we come back to the case of financial predation discussed above. 
Financial predation theory provides a clear setting for antitrust analysis. In order to check if 
such an explanation may be relevant, we have to consider the following conditions: i) Does 
the competitor rely on external funding? ii) Do the financing conditions depend on the 
performance of the borrower? iii) Does the aggressive conduct of the incumbent reduce the 
ability of the competitor to obtain external finance? iv) Is the impact of the reduced cash flow 
on the incumbent’s financing opportunities limited? v) Is the incumbent is able to recoup the 
reduced profits once exclusion is realized? 
 
The first two conditions require an analysis of the financial contracts of the competitor; 
condition iii) does not necessarily imply that the incumbent is pricing below its short-run 
incremental costs, as it would in other predatory stories, since even an efficient competitor 
might be in trouble with financial obligations when revenues do not cover all the costs. 
Finally, condition iv) can be verified by looking at the possibilities for internal financing from 
other lines of business, or at the impact of localized losses of the incumbent on the volumes of 
credit received, while point v) can be assessed by considering the prospects of future entry 
into the market.  
 
To sum up, exclusion within the same market follows a common pattern: a short-run sacrifice 
in profits and a long-run recoupment of the losses; this pattern appears, for example, in the 
predation scenarios described above, namely, reputation, signal jamming and financial 
predation. In each case, exclusion can be achieved through a wide set of strategic tools and 
practices, which, however, can also be part of normal competition. Hence, in order to 
distinguish abusive from competitive behaviour we have to carefully identify a precise story 
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of competitive harm and the restrictions on the facts that need to be established in order to 
substantiate it. 
 
 
Section 2: Exclusion in adjacent markets  
 
The actions of dominant firms may also generate anticompetitive effects in what are known as 
related or adjacent markets. An adjacent market is a market horizontally related to the home 
market,12 in the sense that competitive conditions in one market depend on competitive 
conditions in the other, and the products are sold directly to  customers. . 
 
The link between the two markets may be established through a variety of practices. It may 
involve pure bundling, mixed bundling (conditional discounts), tying, full-line forcing, rebate 
policies, access to interfaces, technical integration, proprietary standards, and compatibility 
choices. Examples of these practices are the bundling and technical integration of the 
Windows operating system and the web browser by Microsoft; the tying of nail guns to the 
sale of exploding cartridges by Hilti; or the early IBM Transamerica case involving the 
redesign and incompatibility of IBM’s CPU with non-IBM peripheral tape drive systems. 
Such business strategies often yield benefits to consumers, but they may also have 
anticompetitive effects if the dominant firm distorts competition in the market adjacent to its 
own home market in order to exclude or discipline rivals in that market, or to influence entry 
conditions in the home market. 
 
The key condition needed for these actions to cause competitive harm, is that the linkage must 
place some rivals at a competitive disadvantage so that they cannot compete effectively in the 
adjacent market or so that they might be deterred from competing in the home market.  
 
In the short-term, some consumers may benefit, while others may be hurt. This is the case, for 
example, when the linkage is made through bundling, since the design of the bundle will 
favour consumers with certain preferences and hurt others. Something similar happens if the 
                                                 
12 This feature distinguishes these markets from vertically related markets (see Rey, P., and J. Tirole (2003), A 
Primer on Foreclosure, forthcoming in Handbook of Industrial Organization Vol. 3,  M. Armstrong and R. 
Porter, eds., Elsevier:Amsterdam). 
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link between the products is made through technical integration or compatibility choices. In 
the longer-term, if the linkage hurts the competitive process, all consumers may be hurt due to 
the exit (or lack of entry) of some rivals. These business practices will be less of a concern 
whenever several companies engage in providing bundles of complementary goods, since in 
that instance prices tend to be lower as firms take into account that a low price for a product 
enhances the demand for its complement. 
 
In addition to having been the subject of potential efficiency explanations, the traditional 
leverage argument has also been subject to the Chicago critique. According to this view, the 
dominant firm enjoys a position of market power only in the home market, even if there are 
two markets and thus two sources of profits to be made. It will have no interest in reducing 
competition in the adjacent market and will extract all its profit in the home market. As a 
simple example, consider the case where the two products are complements. Imagine a firm 
which is dominant in the market for product A and considers leveraging its power in the 
market for a complement B, where for simplicity we assume that B has no value for the 
consumer unless consumed together with A. A has value on a stand-alone basis. Under these 
conditions, the dominant firm will be interested in the provision of B by third parties at the 
lowest possible cost, since this will boost demand for A. Taking advantage of its dominant 
position in the home market, the company will be able to increase the price of A and thus 
benefit from the increased willingness to pay. Under these conditions the dominant company 
will have no interest in reducing competition in the adjacent market, since any profit increase 
in market B will be more than offset by lower profits in market A.  
 
The Chicago critique has prompted the development of new economic theories that provide a 
sound analytical rationale for the existence of strategic leveraging of market power in adjacent 
markets by dominant firms.  
 
The first line of argument focuses on those cases where the products of the two markets are 
independent.  In this case bundling independent goods can be part of a commitment strategy 
that tries to prevent entry.13 By credibly committing to sell the products only as a bundle, the 
dominant firm commits itself to a very aggressive pricing policy if entry occurs, and this 
discourages entry. The aggressive pricing is due to the fact that the dominant firm loses sales 
                                                 
13 See Whinston, M.D. (1990), Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, American Economic Review, 80: 837-59. 
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in both the home and the adjacent market when it faces competition in the adjacent market. 
The commitment story builds on the idea that competing in bundles involves setting lower 
prices, and this will make entry less attractive.14 However, this sort of commitment through 
bundling is not easy to achieve.  
  
Bundling and similar practices that tie or technically integrate related products can also be 
used as a tool to gain competitive advantage with negative effects on competitors when the 
products are in principle substitutes, but, nonetheless, there are demand-side benefits from 
their joint supply. A dominant firm may bundle a product with those in adjacent markets, 
exploiting these demand-side effects that, as a consequence, will not be available to 
competitors or entrants.15  
 
A third set of arguments deals with markets where the products are complementary, but the 
Chicago critique does not apply because the dynamics of the market stem from the cost or 
supply side. For example, consider a market where firms compete through upfront R&D 
investments and, as a consequence, entry is risky. A potential entrant can enter the market if it 
succeeds in innovation and obtains a superior technology. By irreversibly tying the two 
products to one another, the incumbent firm may be able to diminish the expected return in 
any one market, because successful entry now requires entering both markets simultaneously. 
Thus, tying makes the prospects of investment less certain, reducing the entrants’ incentive 
for investment and innovation.16 Or consider a situation where the products are related from 
the cost side, for example, because the producer may benefit from scale and scope 
economies.17  By bundling the two products the incumbent may deny entrants access to a 
large fraction of the market, and thereby the possibility of achieving minimum efficient scale. 
A key condition for this result is that entry be easier (or faster) in the adjacent than in the 
home market. Entry into the adjacent market is just an intermediate step towards competing in 
the complementary home market. By making entry in the adjacent market impossible, the 
incumbent tries to prevent entry into his home market. 
                                                 
14 See Matutes, C., and P. Regibeau (1988), Mix and Match: Product Compatibility Without Network 
Externalities, Rand Journal of Economics, 19; 219-234. 
15 See Nalebuff, B. (2003), Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects. Part 1. Conceptual issues, DTI Economics 
Paper Nº1, February. 
16 See Choi, J.P., and C. Stefanadis (2001), Tying, Investment and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, Rand Journal 
of Economics, 32: 52-71. 
17 See Carlton and Waldman (2002), op. cit. 
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 In sum, the modern economic analysis of strategic leveraging of a dominant position in 
adjacent markets has shown that, beyond the Chicago school critique, there may well be 
sound profit-maximizing reasons why dominant firms attempt to extend their market power 
beyond their home market. Most importantly, economic analysis provides policy-makers with 
a fairly detailed roadmap of the specific circumstances that need to be present (such as the 
relationship between the products, the costs of entry, or the irreversibility of bundling) for 
these leveraging practices to be judged as detrimental to the competitive process. 
 
 
Section 3: Exclusion in vertically related markets 
 
The last kind of competitive harm we will consider is the exclusion of a competitor from a 
market that is vertically related to the market where the incumbent firm is dominant. The 
common features are as follows: (i) The dominant firm controls a “bottleneck”, that is, an 
input in the production process that is necessary for upstream or downstream firms to exert 
their activity. (ii) The dominant firm forecloses these vertically related markets by denying or 
otherwise limiting access to its bottleneck to one or more competitors. For example, the 
owner of an infrastructure such as rail tracks or port facilities may deny access to this 
infrastructure to rail transportation service operators, thereby preventing them from providing 
their services in an effective way. The access denial can be complete, as in the case of a 
refusal to deal, or partial, as when the bottleneck owner favours some firms (e.g., its 
subsidiary) to the detriment of others. This foreclosure concern is particularly prominent in 
industries that have been liberalized through a vertical separation between the infrastructure, 
featuring the characteristics of a natural monopoly, and the production of goods or the 
provision of services using that infrastructure. The expected gains from such liberalization, in 
terms of reduced managerial slack, lower costs and prices, higher rates of innovation, and so 
forth, could be at risk in the absence of proper access to the infrastructure. This may call for a 
detailed and on-going regulation of access conditions that falls outside the scope of the 
present report. In other circumstances, however, a similar concern may arise in unregulated 
industries.  
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Foreclosure can be performed in various ways. The bottleneck owner can for example 
integrate vertically into the targeted market and refuse to deal with potential competitors; 
airlines’ computerized reservation systems have for example involved issues of this type. 
Relatedly, the “forecloser” may make the bottleneck good incompatible with competitors' 
products or technologies, or engage in tie-ins and refuse to unbundle. In the presence of 
economies of scope or scale requiring cooperation among firms in the same market, a 
dominant group of firms may put its competitors at a disadvantage by refusing to cooperate. 
In the absence of integration the bottleneck owner can grant exclusivity to a subset of firms, 
and thus de facto exclude their rivals. Alternatively, it can favour some competitors over 
others; it can for example discriminate explicitly, e.g., through personalized rebates, or 
implicitly, e.g., through loyalty programs or growth-based rebates that are formally available 
to all but tailored to the needs of specific customers. Similarly, substantial quantity discounts 
may allow the survival of only a few customers; for instance, a large enough fixed fee can 
transform a potentially competitive downstream industry into a natural monopoly industry. 
Such considerations (besides many others) played a role in the process of enacting the 
Robinson-Patman Act in the US in 1936.  
 
The traditional foreclosure concern is that the bottleneck owner may leverage its market 
power in the related markets. However, as pointed out by the Chicago School critique, there is 
a single final market and therefore only one profit to be reaped. And since the dominant firm 
can get this profit by exerting its market power over the bottleneck, it has no incentive to 
distort competition in the other markets; on the contrary, imperfect competition in the 
downstream market may actually create distortions and reduce the profitability of the 
bottleneck, e.g., by reducing the variety or quality of the goods and services produced. 
 
While the Chicago critique is correct, anticompetitive effects may still arise in specific 
circumstances.18 For example, as already mentioned in the case of adjacent markets, the 
bottleneck owner may deter competition in a vertically related market to protect its home 
market.19 Alternatively, the bottleneck owner may face a commitment problem, which makes 
it difficult to exert its monopoly power without engaging in exclusionary practices. Indeed, 
once it has sold access to a first competitor, it has an incentive to provide access to other 
                                                 
18  See Rey and Tirole (2003), op. cit., for an overview 
19  See Carlton and Waldman (2002), op. cit. 
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competitors as well, even though those firms will compete with the first one and reduce its 
profits; this opportunistic behaviour reduces ex ante the bottleneck owner’s profit (in the 
example just given, the first firm is willing to pay and buy less); more generally, the 
bottleneck owner would like to commit to a certain volume of access, so as to limit 
competition and profit dissipation, but it may be tempted to grant more access when dealing 
bilaterally with each competitor; as a result, competition in related markets “percolates” in the 
bottleneck market and dissipates the dominant firm’ profit. When this commitment problem is 
serious and cannot be solved through adequate contractual provisions, the bottleneck owner 
may wish to restrict or eliminate competition in these related markets through the types of 
practices mentioned above.20 For example, refusing to deal with all downstream firms but 
one, or entering into an exclusive dealing agreement with that particular firm, eliminates 
downstream competition and thus fosters the upstream firm’s ability to exploit its market 
power. Remarkably, banning discrimination would also help the bottleneck owner to resist 
demands for selective price cuts and thus contribute to maintaining high prices. Vertical 
integration also constitutes an alternative solution to the upstream firm’s commitment 
problem. 
 
In such situations, the intervention of competition authorities may generate more competition 
in the related markets and thus in the industry as a whole. While any such intervention 
benefits consumers, e.g. in the short-run through lower prices or in the long-run through 
higher rates of innovation in the related markets, it also regulates the bottleneck owner’s rate 
of return. In the long-run it may thus have an adverse impact on the dominant firm’s 
incentives to invest or innovate and may for example impede the development of a key 
infrastructure. No prospective licensee would want to pay much for the use of a new 
technology if it knew that the licensor would “flood the market” with similar licensees; 
mandating access through additional licenses would thus reduce the innovator’s profitability 
and consequently its incentives to invest in R&D.  
 
To sum up, modern economic analysis has gone beyond the Chicago school critique and 
identified several reasons why a firm may use its dominant position in one market to distort 
competition in vertically related markets. Furthermore, several alternative types of practices 
                                                 
20  See Hart, O., and J. Tirole (1990), Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity (Microeconomics) 205-285. 
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can be used to that purpose – e.g., refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, prohibitively high access 
prices for downstream rivals, etc. Therefore, when vertical foreclosure is the concern, one 
should treat these alternative practices in a consistent manner. The economic approach also 
emphasizes the relation between ex post intervention and ex ante investment incentives. It can 
thus help competition authorities to identify the specific circumstances calling for 
intervention. 
 
 
 
Chapter III: Implications for practices 
 
 
The previous chapter has highlighted the economic approach to different types of competitive 
harm. We now discuss how this approach can be put to work in Article 82 cases. The above 
discussion already stressed that several alternative practices can often serve the same 
anticompetitive purpose. Conversely, when a complaint arises or when a competition 
authority suspects an abuse of dominance, from an economic perspective the first question is: 
What is the nature of the competitive harm involved in that case? Pursuing this question 
brings several benefits.  
 
First, it allows a clear identification of the “economic toolbox” of relevant arguments. For 
example, the type of reasoning involved for adjacent markets is quite distinct from those that 
may be relevant when exclusion arises in the dominant firm’s core market. Second, while 
creative imagination in business relations can lead to an infinite number of different practices, 
there are not that many types of competitive harm and for each one the established toolbox of 
relevant, consistent economic arguments is relatively limited; in addition, each line of 
reasoning outlines the key facts that need to be checked. Thus, identifying the nature of the 
competitive harm at stake can both facilitate and speed up the investigation process, and 
contribute to maintaining high standards of predictability. Third, as already noted this 
approach guarantees a consistent treatment of the alternative practices that could serve the 
same anticompetitive purpose.  
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Once a competitive harm has been identified and the relevant facts established, the next step 
should be to see if pro-competitive effects might counterbalance them. There again, an 
economic approach first identifies the nature of the benefit for competition and the facts that 
need to be established. It is only after these steps that a proper balance can be assessed.  
 
In this chapter we illustrate this approach for various practices. We start with a general 
discussion of price discrimination, which is relevant for many other practices: rebates, for 
example, typically involve some discrimination, while exclusive dealing can be interpreted as 
an extreme case of discrimination; likewise, tying and predatory pricing often involve some 
form of discrimination. While price discrimination can be part of an exclusionary strategy, it 
often can also bring benefits, particularly when large fixed costs are present; in a given price 
discrimination case, it is thus again important to identify the exact nature of the potential 
anticompetitive harm, as well as the possible pro-competitive effect of price discrimination in 
the context of the case.  
 
We then discuss several classical types of practices: rebates, tying, refusals to deal, exclusive 
dealing and predatory pricing. In each case, we first relate the practice in question to the 
exclusionary effects outlined in Chapter II. We then review (some of) the potential pro-
competitive benefits of the practice; finally, we illustrate, using an example, how the effect-
based approach could be applied to the practice.  
 
 
Section 1: Price Discrimination 
 
Price discrimination consists in charging different prices for different units and/or to different 
customers.21 It can take various forms. In particular, it can be explicit, as when different 
customers are offered different prices on the basis of their age (e.g., reduced prices for 
children or senior citizens) or on the basis of other characteristics (e.g., student fares, 
                                                 
21 This simple definition raises tricky issues when, for example, different customers involve different costs. 
Should “no discrimination” then mean the same price for all, or should cost differentials be borne by the 
customers? Interestingly, while competition law usually insists that any difference in prices should reflect a cost 
difference, universal service obligations, for example, tend instead to insist on “equal treatment”, according to 
which all customers should be offered the same price in spite of possibly large cost differentials.  
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geographical segmentation), or it can be implicit, as when all customers are formally offered 
the same menu of options, but different customers de facto pick different options and thus end 
up paying different prices (thus, for example, volume discounts allow firms to offer better 
deals to large customers).   
 
Antitrust policy and jurisdiction have traditionally been very strict about price discrimination, 
sometimes even treating it as a per se offense against the law. Price was – and is – seen as a 
tool by which the dominant firm exploits its power to earn more profits. Price discrimination 
is also considered to be unfair because some people have to pay more for the good in question 
than others. This latter point, in particular, resonates in public discussions about pricing. 
 
Economic analysis has also long put a lot of weight on the exploitative effects of price 
discrimination allowing the dominant firm to earn more profits. Economic analysis has also 
stressed that the distribution of output across consumers tends to be inefficient if different 
consumers pay different prices and presumably put different valuations on the last units they 
purchase. These arguments imply that any price discrimination which reduces (or barely 
increases) total output is necessarily detrimental for total welfare and even more so for 
consumer welfare. 
 
However, more recently economic analysis has also shown that, in some circumstances, price 
discrimination can increase total welfare and even consumer welfare. In particular, this is 
likely to be the case if price discrimination permits a significant expansion of output. 22 This 
might happen, for instance, because additional offerings at lower prices permit the firm to 
serve additional customer segments. Moreover, if the firm has significant sunk investments, 
the greater profits which the firm obtains from price discrimination may be necessary to 
provide a return on these investments. These returns may also encourage the firm to invest 
more, providing additional pro-competitive effects in the future. In all these cases, price 
discrimination is likely to benefit consumers, sometimes even those who pay the higher 
prices: Even though they pay more than other consumers, they benefit from the fact that the 
firm invests and makes its output available to them. 
 
                                                 
22 For an extensive welfare analysis along these lines, see for example Varian, H., (1989), Price Discrimination, 
in R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 597-
654. 
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Such considerations have led economists to be skeptical about using the simple notion of 
“fairness” or “unfairness” to assess price discrimination. In the examples given, prohibiting 
price discrimination on the grounds of unfairness to those consumers who have to pay a 
higher price may end up making these very consumers worse off.  
 
At the same time, one must worry about the fact that any assessment of the fairness or 
unfairness of price discrimination is necessarily based on a local assessment of distributive 
effects. There is no way of telling whether such a local assessment is consistent with global 
concerns for distribution.23 With price discrimination, consumers that are more sensitive to 
prices will be offered lower prices and will thus benefit while the others are more likely to be 
hurt. From a global perspective, the assessment of this distributive effect depends, for 
example, on whether the greater sensitivity to prices reflects a higher level of education or a 
greater need to turn each euro around twice before spending it. In the first case, the 
distributive effect favours people with a higher education level, in the second case, people 
who are poorer. Is a pricing scheme that favours poorer people really “unfair”? However, 
such global distributive concerns can hardly be made the subject of antitrust proceedings 
under a rule of law. Therefore, it seems advisable to assess price discrimination less in terms 
of fairness and more in terms of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. 
 
For price discrimination does also have an impact on the way firms compete.  Thus, price 
discrimination tends to intensify competition among oligopolists and thereby raise consumer 
surplus at the expense of industry profits. Consider, for example, a case of customer poaching, 
where customers face switching costs and firms offer lower prices to the customers belonging 
to their rivals’ customer segments.24  Basically, such discrimination intensifies competition, 
because it makes it possible for a firm to attack its rivals’ customer bases, as well as new 
customer segments, while maintaining higher margins on its own installed base. But since all 
the firms have similar strategic incentives to exploit price discrimination, the industry faces a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation, and competition is more intense than with uniform prices. More 
                                                 
23 For the distinction between local justice and global justice, see Elster, J. (1992), Local Justice: How 
Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens, New York & Newbury Park: Sage.  
24 For detailed analytical models, see, for example, Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole, (2000), Customer Poaching and 
Brand Switching, Rand Journal of Economics, 31: 634-657, or Chen, Y. (1997), Paying Customers to Switch, 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6: 877-897; for a borad perspective, see Stole, L. (2005), Price 
Discrimination and Imperfect Competition, forthcoming in Handbook of Industrial Organization Vol. 3, , M. 
Armstrong and R. Porter, eds., Elsevier:Amsterdam. 
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generally, price discrimination leads to competition on a customer per customer basis, which 
is likely to be more intense than when firms are constrained to offer the same price to all 
customers. Price discrimination encourages the firm to target more customers, by allowing the 
firm to offer specific deals to these customers without compromising the profits achieved on 
more captive customers. In particular, this reasoning militates for allowing an incumbent to 
respond non-uniformly to limited entry (“meeting competition” strategies). 
 
Even when a firm has enough market power to be dominant, the ability to engage in price 
discrimination might very well reduce its market power. For example, the firm may be 
tempted to grant concessions when a particularly good customer insists on getting a better 
deal, or when a customer suffering from a temporary downturn asks for a specific treatment. 
And indeed, the ability to negotiate good deals in bilateral bargaining constitutes one the 
drivers of competition, particularly when the customers are themselves competing against 
each other in a downstream market. In such circumstances, a ban on discrimination actually 
helps the dominant firm resist requests for lower prices and thus exploit its market power. 
Indeed, if any dominant firm is obliged to offer similar deals to all equivalent consumers, it 
can no longer offer customer-specific discounts based on individual bargaining. But then it 
will be more reluctant to grant a concession to a particular customer if the concession must be 
generalized to all other customers. Thus, a no-discrimination requirement serves as a very 
effective device to enhance the market power of the dominant firm, relative to a situation 
where price discrimination, in the form of customer-specific bargaining, would be allowed.25
 
In many important applications it is not sufficient to evaluate the welfare effects of price 
discrimination by comparing prices, production, and consumer surplus to those associated 
with uniform pricing within the framework of a given market structure. The option of price 
discrimination may affect entry (or exit) decisions and long-run investment decisions in ways 
that may significantly affect the long-run performance of the industry. For instance, the use of 
certain types of rebates warrants detailed analysis, as will be discussed in the next section.  
 
Overall, these arguments thus support a view according to which price discrimination may, in 
fact, promote efficiency and benefit consumers even when firms have significant market 
                                                 
25  The impact of a non-discrimination requirement here is similar to the effect of “most-favoured 
customer” clauses that allow a firm to commit itself to maintain high prices.  
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power. Price discrimination can, however, also serve anticompetitive purposes. In particular, 
it can be associated with any of the exclusionary effects highlighted in the previous chapter. 
Selective price cuts can for example reduce the cost of predatory pricing strategies to deter 
entry into the dominant firm’s home market or into adjacent markets (in the latter case, mixed 
bundling also involves some form of discrimination); and access price discrimination can be 
at the heart of vertical foreclosure cases. But then, it is the exclusionary effect that causes the 
anticompetitive harm, rather than discrimination per se. This therefore again calls for an 
effects-based approach, which first identifies the type of exclusionary effect involved, rather 
than a form-based approach, to the spectrum of business practices in which price 
discrimination is a central element.    
 
 
Section 2: Rebates 
 
 
Rebates may come in the form of pure volume discounts: the firm then offers a rebate if the 
quantity bought by a customer exceeds a given threshold. In this case, the rebate may apply to 
the incremental quantities (only those above the threshold) or to all the units bought by the 
customer as soon as the threshold is reached. In the former case, the rebate scheme induces a 
progressive discount, and in all cases, we have (possibly discontinuous) non-linear pricing. 
By contrast, when it applies to the whole quantities bought by the customer, it amounts to 
switching to a new price scheme as soon as the threshold is achieved. Rebates can also be 
offered to a customer whose growth in the volume of purchases lies above a given threshold. 
Rebates on a particular product can also take the form of a more advantageous offer to 
customers who buy another product together with the initial one. Rebates then involve mixed 
bundling (see chapter II, 2 and chapter III, 3). Finally, fidelity rebates may be offered: for 
instance, rebates can be conditional on the client buying all its quantities, or at least a given 
percentage of them, from the firm. In most cases, rebates imply some form of discrimination 
between customers. To this extent a part of the analysis of Section 1 (in this chapter) above is 
relevant. 
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a) Potential anticompetitive effects 
 
Generally speaking, a consequence of this practice is that competition operates on a customer 
basis rather than on a “unit sale” basis, which can be anti- or pro-competitive, depending on 
the circumstances.  
 
The anticompetitive effects of rebates may be of any kind described in Chapter 2: 
• Rebates can exclude actual or potential competitors from the market on which the 
firm is dominant. This is the case, for instance, for selective rebates offered to those 
of the customers of the firm that would switch to a new entrant were the rebate not 
offered, or if the rebate is conditional on the percentage of quantities bought by the 
customer from the firm. In most of these cases, rebates may be associated with 
predatory pricing on some of the units sold. Moreover, like predatory prices, rebates 
induce short-run sacrifices and may have exclusionary effects either by inducing exit 
or by discouraging entry.  
• They can also involve horizontal foreclosure: this is for instance the case if the rebate 
is offered to a customer that buys the product of the dominant firm on an adjacent 
market together with the product on the main market. This is an example where 
rebates also tie together the products on two different markets.  
• Finally, rebates can induce vertical foreclosure. This is the case for instance when a 
producer offers to its retailers in order to discourage them from selling competitors’ 
products. They may then be associated with an exclusivity clause. Competitors are 
therefore unable to obtain access to a distribution network to sell their products. Of 
course, this mechanism may appear in any vertically related market, where one of the 
stages plays the role of an essential facility. In these “essential facility cases”, rebates 
may eliminate downstream or upstream competition in order to better exploit 
upstream or downstream market power. 
 
b)  Pro-competitive effects and efficiency considerations 
 
Efficiencies may be a cause or a consequence of rebates. A general way of assessing the 
dominance of pro-competitive effects over anticompetitive ones is to check whether total 
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output has increased or not. Pro-competitive effects of rebates may for example appear in the 
following circumstances. 
 
Since rebates allow high and low demand elasticity consumers to be treated differently, elastic 
demand segments tend then to generate lower margins. Consumers with a high elasticity of 
demand thus benefit from the practice, although consumers with a low elasticity may suffer 
from it; the overall effect on consumer welfare is thus a priori ambiguous. But in the spirit of 
Ramsey pricing, in this way rebates may also allow for the recovery of fixed costs, and thus 
encourage R&D investments that involve such large fixed costs. As a result, rebates are more 
likely to have a pro-competitive effect when high fixed costs are involved.  
 
Rebates that are targeted to those consumers who are more likely to switch to competitors 
imply a more intense competition for these consumers; they clearly benefit from this situation. 
The other consumers may indirectly benefit from an increased pressure on the price they face. 
Moreover, prohibiting selective rebates as a reaction against competitive pressure may 
constitute excessive interventionism in the competitive strategies of firms on the part of 
competition authorities. 
 
In a vertical relationship in particular, rebates that take the form of non-linear pricing may be 
used as an incentive mechanism to induce efficient behaviour of retailers. For example, 
rebates can be used to increase retail margins on additional volumes, so as to encourage 
retailers to promote the product. While a uniform reduction in the wholesale price might have 
the same impact on retailers’ incentives, it would be more costly for the supplier. Hence, 
rebates allow suppliers to provide incentives at a lower cost, thereby encouraging suppliers to 
provide more incentives and thus to compete more intensively. More generally, rebate 
schemes can enhance efficiency by solving adverse selection or moral hazard problems.  
 
Rebates may also generate efficiency gains for the dominant firm, for instance, economies of 
scale for this firm, or economies of transaction costs for the customers (the buyer concentrates 
its purchase on a single seller).  
 
These elements lead to a general intuition: rebates that take the form of pure quantity rebates 
are more likely to be motivated by efficiency considerations than fidelity rebates. It is, 
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however, difficult to demonstrate that efficiency considerations motivate the rebate scheme. 
In particular, the mere form of the rebate may not constitute a clear indicator; for instance, 
efficiency considerations might require personalized rebate schemes, tailored to the “size” of 
the retailer, which could take the simple form of “market-share” fidelity rebates.  
 
c) Implementation: An example  
 
To deal with an alleged story of anticompetitive rebates, the competition authority should 
follow the analysis that derives from the previous considerations, e.g., it should first identify 
the kind of exclusionary strategy at work, and look for possible pro-competitive effects of the 
practice. This approach clearly stands in contrast with a per se prohibition; instead, it involves 
a sound analytical framework and relevant data. We illustrate this approach with reference to 
a particular example.  
 
The view of rebates that prevails in the contemporaneous approaches recognizes that the 
anticompetitive effects of this practice can indeed dominate, and that in some cases rebates 
should be prohibited.  For example, a supplier may use rebates so as to impose a penalty on 
new entrants. A customer will switch to a new supplier only if the latter offers a price that is 
lower than the price charged by the incumbent supplier minus the rebate.26 Thus, the rebate is 
analogous to a penalty paid by the entrant; it plays the role of an entry fee, designed to extract 
some of the efficiency gains of new entrants, and by the same token it creates a barrier to 
entry. The rebate clause thus imposes an external effect on potential entrants, and it is this 
externality that makes it profitable for the incumbent supplier and the customer to enter in this 
type of arrangement. Note that the entrant will enter only if its costs are so low that entry 
remains profitable despite the entry fee generated by the rebate. Consumers are harmed 
because the probability of entry is reduced and prices are raised.27  
 
In such a case the competition authority should proceed by asking the following questions: 
 
                                                 
26 Indeed, granting a fidelity rebate of 10 on a reference price of 100 could also be presented as a “penalty for 
breach” of the same amount, based on a reference price of 90; in both cases, to attract the customer a new 
supplier will have to compensate the customer for the lost rebate, and the provision thus acts as a “tax” on the 
new supplier 
27 Cf Aghion and Bolton (1987), op. cit. This model, designed to deal with exclusive dealing, suits perfectly well 
the analysis of rebates. This shows again that various practices may achieve the same anticompetitive effect. 
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• What exactly is the negative externality imposed on a third party that explains why the 
buyer agrees to accept an anticompetitive exclusive dealing contract? If the 
competition authority cannot identify such an external effect, then there is no 
anticompetitive effect and the case should be dismissed. 
• What is the magnitude of the penalty imposed on the entrant? This can be 
approximated by computing the reduction in price that the entrant should offer in order 
to be able to enter the market at various quantity levels.  
• Were in fact efficient competitors kept out of the market by the penalty imposed on 
them? 
• Efficiency effects have to be carefully assessed; among the critical factors are the 
ability of downstream firms to pass on a reduction in their own input prices and the 
incentives given to these downstream firms to exert effort.  
 
 
 
 
Section 3: Tying and bundling 
 
 
a) Tying and bundling may take various forms  
 
First of all, tying consists in making the purchase of one good (the tying good) conditional 
upon the purchase of another one (the tied good), whereas bundling refers to the sale of 
two products together. Bundling may be pure (the goods are available only together) or 
mixed (they are also available separately). Therefore, when tying is at work, the tied 
product may be bought alone, whereas when pure bundling is at work this is impossible. 
Tying and bundling can be achieved through technological links or through a contractual 
practice. Tying and bundling may concern goods that are complements, or substitutes, or 
independent. In the latter case the only link between markets is the fact that both goods are 
bought by the same consumers.  For the sake of exposition we will focus on pure 
bundling, but the analysis also applies to mixed bundling, although potential 
anticompetitive effects are likely to be less stringent in that case. In addition, mixed 
bundling has another advantage, since it makes it possible to offer multiple price formulas 
adapted to the needs of different consumers. Consumers who want only one of the goods 
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can still buy it, while those who want to buy both face lower prices for the bundle. 
Therefore, as in the above discussion of price discrimination, mixed bundling may induce 
higher consumption from some consumers. 
 
The problem is to identify cases where tying is anticompetitive, that is, profitable for the 
firm that implements the practice, while inducing exclusion and hurting consumers.28 
These cases are relatively scarce, a condition which does not favour a prohibition per se.  
 
b) Tying and bundling can give rise to many anticompetitive effects. 
 
• Bundling may serve an exclusionary purpose on the tied market.29  This is the 
commonly expected effect of bundling: since the consumer buys both good A and also 
good B from the dominant firm, either necessarily (if there is pure bundling) or 
because it is advantageous for him (in the case of mixed bundling), a competitor on 
market B cannot profitably sell its product, even if this a better quality product or 
produced at a lower cost. This effect is analogous to predatory pricing. Bundling may 
also be associated with fidelity rebates tying products A and B together. 
• Bundling may be used in order to protect the dominant firm’s home market. This is the 
case, for instance, when it is easier for a competitor to enter market A if it is active on 
the market B with a complementary good. Then, in order to deter entry of its 
competitor on market B into its home market A, a firm might want to sell bundles of 
its own products, therefore eliminating its competitor on market B, and making entry 
into market A unprofitable.   
 
In the last case, bundling forces competition between bundles rather than between elementary 
goods. This form of competition is not necessarily a bad thing, as it may well be more intense 
(see below), but it may force the rival to enter several markets simultaneously, which may 
make entry costlier and/or riskier.  
 
                                                 
28 Chapter 2 recalls the Chicago arguments concerning tying and bundling. 
29 This is also the common “leverage effect” that is feared in mergers involving firms active on adjacent 
markets. 
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c) Pro-competitive effects of tying and bundling 
 
Of course, the analysis of the overall effect on consumers has to take into account the fact that 
the strategies of the dominant firm linking the two markets may also be the result, not of an 
attempt to exclude competitors, but rather of an attempt to improve the efficiency and quality 
of the products supplied in the market.  
 
Like rebates, tying may allow for the recovery of high fixed cost - even when goods are 
independent. In this case, consumers might also benefit from bundling. When goods are 
complementary, additional arguments are at work. Bundling also reduces transaction costs for 
the consumers, who would, in the case of mandatory unbundling, be forced to buy all the 
components separately; still in the case of complementary products, tying guarantees that two 
components of a system good are compatible. Bundling may also boost the demand for the 
complementary good when it is associated with a low price (even zero) for the tied good. In 
the case of complementary goods used in variable proportions, tying may also serve as a 
metering device for the tying good: a well known example is that of photocopiers sold with 
the paper or with after-sales services. The consumption of the latter reveals the intensity of 
preferences for the former and this information allows the firm to discriminate between 
consumers, which may be beneficial to some of them. Making the customers pay for usage as 
well also allows the firm to lower the price of the equipment. This can reduce distortions in 
replacement decisions (both by inducing consumers to internalize the cost of usage and by 
distributing mark-ups over both acquisition and usage, rather than placing them on acquisition 
only); this can also be used to credibly convince customers to try and switch to new types of 
equipment. 
 
Efficiency justifications are particularly common when the linkages are established by 
technological means (technical integration, standards, and compatibility): costs savings, 
quality improvements and the overcoming of information problems are important sources of 
gains. For example, when the quality of two complementary products is uncertain, supplying 
them jointly may alleviate this informational problem. Similarly, bundling complementary 
products may reduce the inefficiency created by double marginalization: the standard 
“Cournot argument”, according to which vertical integration prevents the addition of multiple 
mark-ups, also applies to any two complementary products, not just to vertically related ones. 
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Indeed, tying leads to “system-based” rather than to “component-based” competition, in 
which it is easier to internalize the effect of a price cut for one component on the sales of the 
system. As a result, this system-based competition is likely to be more intense. 30
 
To sum up, depending on the nature of competition, the cost structure on the tied market, the 
magnitude of costs savings associated with bundling, and the existence of strategic reasons, 
bundling can have exclusionary effects or pro-competitive effects and should thus be analyzed 
in the light of the effects of the practice. The potential for efficiency gains is more limited 
when the linkage is achieved through pricing schemes and bundling than when it is achieved 
through technological integration. Still, as in the case where it is used as a metering device, 
bundling can enhance welfare.  
 
d) An example 
 
The naive view of (pure) bundling is the following: a firm that is dominant on market A fears 
entry from a competitor present on market B, where the dominant firm offers its own good. 
Goods A and B are complementary. Therefore the dominant firm offers (pure) bundles of A 
and B and prevents consumers from buying the competitors product. This protects the 
dominant firm from the competitor’s entry into its home market. . However, this is the case 
where the Chicago critique fully applies, as shown in chapter II.2: the firm has no interest in 
reducing competition on market B. Since there is only one monopoly profit to be made, it 
would rather allow the competitor to be active on market B and take advantage of an 
increased demand on market A in order to enjoy a monopoly margin on each unit of good A. 
In the more sophisticated version of this argument,31 entry into one market depends on the 
success of entry into another market: a competitor can, for example, enter market A only if it 
can first enter market B with a better or cheaper product than that of the dominant firm. The 
entry strategy thus involves a dynamic scenario, in which first the dominant firm faces a more 
efficient competitor on market B, and later the same or another firm can enter market A.  The 
dominant firm has an incentive to sell a bundle of A and B: in this way it can deter the first 
competitor in market B, and entry into market A is then less likely.  
                                                 
30 In the absence of tying, cutting the price of one component also benefits mixed systems, where some of the 
components are sold by other firms; as a result, the incentive to cut prices is lower and competition is less 
intense; see Matutes and Regibeau (1988), op. cit. 
31 See Carlton and Waldman (2002), op. cit. 
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There again, there is a commitment problem: once the competitor has entered the market, the 
dominant firm would have an interest to sell goods A and B separately. Technological 
bundling may however be used as a commitment device. As was recently highlighted by J. 
Tirole, the bundling strategy involves sacrifices with regard to a strategy where the firm 
would accommodate entry, as in predatory pricing strategies.32
 
Again, following an effects-based approach regarding this practice requires that the 
competition authority first build a consistent story showing what kind of exclusionary effects 
are at work and that it check the facts that would allow for a pro-competitive explanation of 
the practice. In our particular case, the competition authority should here check the following 
points: 
 
• Does the situation present dynamic features (sequential entry)? 
• Does the existence of a competitor for the complementary product make the entry into 
market A more likely (either from the competitor present on market B, or by a third 
firm that finds it profitable to have a competitive market for good B)? 
• Is the quality of the good offered by the rival on market B higher than that of the 
dominant firm? 
• Is the bundling practice credible? For instance, is it achieved through commercial or 
through technological bundling? 
 
In addition, the competition authority should of course check to ensure that the possible 
efficiencies of the practice are not the major determinant of the firm’s behaviour. This is 
particularly important where compatibility problems are involved (see above). 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See Tirole, J. (2005), A Primer on Tying, Competition Policy International, 1: 1-25. 
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Section 4:  Refusal to Deal 
 
 
Refusal to deal may take several forms. The dominant firm may simply refuse to supply the 
essential good, or it may charge a prohibitively high price. It may make the  bottleneck good 
incompatible with the products offered by its competitors, or it may tie the essential good to 
some other good, thus making it unattractive for competing firms to buy the bundle. Or it may 
sign an exclusive dealing contract with one particular firm, thus excluding others from the 
market (see Section III.5 below).   
 
a) Potential anticompetitive effects 
 
Refusal to deal is a typical form of exclusion in vertically related markets when a dominant 
firm controls an input that is essential for production by competing firms in a downstream (or 
upstream) market. By refusing access to the input good the dominant firm extends its 
monopoly from the market for the essential input to the potentially competitive downstream 
market. However, the monopolization of a downstream market need not have anticompetitive 
effects per se. After all, there is only one final market and only one monopoly profit to be 
reaped. If the dominant firm is able to capture the monopoly profit of the final market even if 
there is downstream competition, then monopolization of the downstream market cannot have 
anticompetitive effects because there is no competition anyway. In this case a refusal to deal 
with downstream firms is likely to be motivated by efficiency arguments.  
 
The dominant firm may also be a group of firms or an industry association refusing access to 
a jointly owned facility. In this case a competitor is excluded on the same or on a horizontally 
adjacent market. Famous examples include Associated Press (1945) and Aspen (1985). In the 
latter case, where a three-mountain ski resort refused to make lift tickets available to a 
competing one-mountain ski resort.33  
 
                                                 
33 See e.g. Ahern, P.  (1994), Refusal to Deal after Aspen, Antitrust Law Journal, 63: 153 ff:  
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b) Pro-competitive effects and efficiency considerations 
 
Upstream firms may be worried that their reputation will suffer if their product is offered by 
inferior downstream firms. If the upstream firm cannot effectively monitor and control the 
downstream firms, excluding them from the market may be the only possible way  to increase 
consumer surplus and industry profits. Similarly, for technological reasons, it may be 
necessary to closely monitor downstream production by the upstream supplier. This may only 
be feasible in a vertically integrated firm. Or downstream firms may free-ride on the 
marketing expenses of the upstream firm. In order to recoup this investment, the dominant 
firm may have to exclude downstream competition.34  
 
But even if a refusal to deal harms consumers in the short-run, it may be socially beneficial in 
the long-run. If the bottleneck is the result of investment or innovation activities of the 
dominant firm then forcing the firm to give its competitors access to the bottleneck is an 
expropriation of the returns of the firm’s efforts. This may discourage this and other firms 
from investing in the future, and it may reduce the incentives to innovate. Tolerating a 
(temporary) monopoly may be the best way to promote investment and innovation incentives 
and thus dynamic efficiency.  
 
If the bottleneck is due to an intellectual property right, the competition authorities should be 
particularly reluctant to interfere. Intellectual property rights have been granted by the state in 
order to create market power and to give innovators a reward for their efforts. Thus, it is 
inconsistent if the state interferes with these rights ex post and takes market power away. 
Indeed the mere prospect of interference affects the parties’ bargaining powers in negotiating 
a voluntary agreement. To the extent that the rival firm obtains favourable terms by 
threatening to sue in order to impose a duty to deal, the bottleneck owner obtains a lower 
return on his investment. Because there is no active intervention, the effect is not visible, but 
nonetheless it reduces the incentive to innovate.  
 
                                                 
34 For a more detailed discussion of efficiency defenses for vertical foreclosure, see Rey and Tirole (2003), op. 
cit., Section 5. 
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c) Implementation: an example 
 
Refusal to deal increases the market power of a dominant firm only if it was unable to fully 
exploit its monopoly power over the bottleneck good beforehand. For example, this is the case 
if the dominant firm has a problem committing to charging all the downstream firms the 
monopoly price. The reason is that once the monopolist has contracted with one downstream 
firm on the supply of the essential good, he has an incentive to supply the other firms at more 
favourable conditions in order to further increase his profits at the expense of the first 
downstream firm, which then has to compete with the other firms on the downstream market. 
However, the downstream firms anticipate such opportunistic behaviour by the upstream firm 
and will buy the essential good only at a discount. This reduces the profits of the monopolist. 
He may restore his monopoly power only if he manages to eliminate competition on the 
downstream market altogether. In such a case, refusal to deal could have anticompetitive 
effects.  
 
If the competition authority suspects that such a mechanism is a work, it should proceed as 
follows: 
 
• First it has to establish that there are anticompetitive effects. Suppose that the dominant 
firm sold the essential good to downstream firms in the past, but that it now refuses to deal 
with them. If the price for the final good remains unchanged and if the stock price of the 
downstream firms is not affected, then it is unlikely that the refusal to supply has 
increased the dominant firm’s market power and reduced social welfare. If the dominant 
firm can come up with a convincing efficiency defence for the refusal to deal, the case 
should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the dominant firm found it difficult to commit 
to the monopoly price when there was downstream competition and if it manages to raise 
the final price paid by consumers by monopolizing the downstream market, then this is an 
indication of anticompetitive effects.  
• What is the source of the bottleneck? If the bottleneck is mainly due to the investment and 
innovation efforts of the dominant firm, the returns of this investment should not be 
expropriated and the competition authority should not interfere even at the cost of a static 
inefficiency (a temporary monopoly). The competition authority should be particularly 
reluctant to interfere when the source of the bottleneck is an intellectual property right. 
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However, if the bottleneck stems from historical legacy, economies of scale or scope, or 
network externalities, an intervention may be justified.  
• Is the intervention likely to be effective without impairing efficiency?  Enforcement may 
be difficult and costly. Moreover, the competition authority is likely to be drawn into the 
process of determining the terms on which the dealing must take place, i.e. prices, 
conditions and technical specifications. The authority is not really qualified to set such 
terms, so its intervention may cause substantial inefficiencies. Thus, the competition 
authority should be aware of the harm that it may cause, and intervene cautiously, 
refraining from active involvement in the dealing terms.35   Structural remedies, such as 
divestitures and line-of-business restrictions, often involve substantial transaction costs 
and should be considered only as a last resort. 
 
The competition authority should also be aware that its approach to refusal-to-deal cases 
affects outcomes even when firms reach a voluntary agreement so, in fact, there is no refusal 
to deal. The possibility that the bottleneck owner may be sued affects the participants’ 
bargaining positions. If the rival firm can threaten to sue in order to impose a deal, it is in a 
much stronger position than if the owner of the bottleneck can refuse to deal. As long as these 
cases are not contested in legal proceedings, these effects are not visible. Nevertheless, they 
raise the same concerns as the authority’s handling of refusal-to-deal cases itself: If the 
anticipation of strict policy intervention leads to a voluntary agreement at low access prices, 
this reduces the returns to the bottleneck owner’s investments; if the anticipation of weak 
policy intervention leads to a voluntary agreement at high access prices, this restrains the 
rival’s ability to compete downstream. To avoid competitive harm from these effects of 
anticipations, the competition authority should have clear guidelines for the assessment of 
refusal-to-deal cases, providing well-specified standards by which to compare exclusionary 
concerns and concerns about returns on investments.  
 
 
                                                 
35 In this context, it is noteworthy that in the United States court interventions under the “essential facilities” 
doctrine have usually left the determination of terms of dealing to the parties. 
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Section 5:  Exclusive Dealing 
 
Exclusive dealing refers to all practices that commit a firm to deal exclusively with some 
vertically related firms but not with others. For example, a dominant seller may prohibit 
buyers from dealing with its competitors, or a dominant seller may commit to deal exclusively 
with one (or several, as in the Eurotunnel case) vertically related firm (or firms), but not with 
others.  
 
a) Potential ant-competitive effects 
 
Exclusive dealing may be used against a (potential) rival on the same or on a horizontally 
adjacent market if enough buyers agree to exclusively buy the good from one dominant firm 
and if the rival finds it more difficult to enter this or the adjacent market should he be 
prevented from dealing with these buyers. Exclusive dealing contracts may also restrict entry 
to a vertically related market if the dominant firm is the sole producer of a bottleneck good 
that is essential for a downstream market and if the dominant firm commits to supply the 
bottleneck good exclusively to one firm but not to others. In this case exclusive dealing may 
be used as a substitute for vertical integration and have similar effects to a refusal to deal (see 
Section III.4). 
 
It is often argued that exclusive dealing arrangements cause competitive harm because they 
raise the cost of entry into the market or deter entry altogether. However, this argument is too 
simplistic. A rational buyer would not be willing to sign an exclusive dealing arrangement if 
such a contract obliged him to buy from an incumbent while a (possibly more efficient) 
competitor is willing to enter the industry. An exclusive dealing contract will be agreed to 
only if it is beneficial for both parties. Thus, the exclusive dealing contract must either be 
efficiency enhancing, in which case there is no competitive harm. Or it must increase the 
payoffs of the two contracting parties at the expense of a third party. In recent years several 
economic theories have been developed showing that exclusive dealing may indeed have 
anticompetitive effects if it imposes an externality on a third party. For example, an exclusive 
dealing contract that makes entry more difficult may be used to extract rents from a potential 
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entrant.36 Alternatively, if the buyers cannot coordinate their actions then the seller can bribe 
some buyers into an exclusive dealing arrangement at the expense of the other buyers.37 The 
common denominator in all of these anticompetitive effects is that the exclusive dealing 
contract imposes an externality on third parties. 
 
b) Pro-competitive effects and efficiency considerations 
 
There are several efficiency defences for exclusive dealing arrangements. The most frequent 
argument is that exclusivity may be necessary to protect and encourage relationship-specific 
investments. For example, a manufacturer will invest in the training and education of 
downstream firms only if it can be assured that this investment will not be used to benefit 
upstream competitors. Thus, in order to protect its investment, the manufacturer may have to 
insist on an exclusive arrangement. Similarly, a manufacturer may adopt an exclusivity clause 
in order to promote “retailer loyalty”, i.e. to encourage the retailer to tailor its promotional 
efforts towards the manufacturer’s product.  
 
Another efficiency argument is that the manufacturer may use an exclusive dealing 
arrangement in order to maintain the value of his product. It may want to exclude certain 
“inferior” retailers from selling its product if these retailers are not sufficiently trained or if 
their reputation does not fit the reputation of the product. For example, the producer of 
expensive luxury perfumes may not want its fragrances to be sold in cheap discount stores 
because this damages its reputation.  
 
An exclusive dealing contract may also be used to prevent “excessive” entry. If entry involves 
significant sunk costs, there may be too much entry because of the “business stealing effect”: 
A new firm that contemplates entering the market does not take into account that some of its 
prospective customers will switch away from existing firms. Thus the revenue that the new 
firm generates may be larger than the social value it creates. Other efficiency defences are 
parallel to those given for a refusal to deal in Section III.4.  
 
                                                 
36 See Aghion and Bolton (1987), op. cit.   
37 See Rasmussen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000), op. cit.  
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c) Implementation: an example 
 
We argued above that an exclusive dealing contract may have anticompetitive effects only if 
it imposes a negative externality on a third party. Thus, the competition authority first has to 
point out exactly which externality on a third party it is that explains why the buyer agreed to 
accept an anticompetitive exclusive dealing contract. If the competition authority cannot 
identify such an external effect, then there is no anticompetitive effect and the case should be 
dismissed. 
 
An example of such an externality is given by what are known as “buyers’ coordination 
stories”.38 Consider a potential entrant which needs a minimum amount of demand for entry 
to be profitable (e.g. because of large fixed costs). Suppose that there are many buyers and 
that the incumbent seller offers to each of the buyers a (small) rebate if he signs an exclusive 
dealing contract. A buyer accepts this offer if the rebate is larger than his expected loss due to 
the reduced likelihood of entry. However, he does not take into account the negative external 
effect of his decision on the profits of other buyers. Thus, if buyers cannot coordinate their 
behaviour, the externality they impose on each other may result in deterring entry. Exclusive 
dealing contracts can thus be anticompetitive when buyer coordination is needed.  
 
In order to establish that such a mechanism is at work, the competition authority should prove 
a number of facts: 
 
• there are many small size buyers;  
• no communication nor coordination between them on procurement of input is at 
work. For instance, this would not be verified where super-markets delegate the 
power of listing products to a centralized agency and even negotiate the transaction 
on aggregate sales with this agency; 
• on the supply side, the magnitude of the efficient size for an entrant should also be 
evaluated. If it appears that a competitor can enter the market selling a small number 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Aghion and Bolton (1987),  op. cit., Rasmussen, E. B., J. M. Ramseyer and J. S. Wiley 
(1991), Naked Exclusion, American Economic Review, 81: 1137-1145, Segal, I., and M. D. Whinston (2000), 
Naked Exclusion: Comment, American Economic Review, 90(1):296-309, and Fumagalli, C., and M. Motta 
(2002), Buyers’ coordination exclusive dealing and entry, when buyers compete, London CEPR Discussion 
paper. 
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of units, for instance because the required fixed costs are small, then exclusive 
dealing contracts are unlikely to prevent entry. On the other hand, exclusive dealing 
contracts are more likely to be anticompetitive if large fixed costs are at work.  
 
 
The next step for the competition authority is to check whether there are efficiency defences 
justifying the exclusive dealing arrangement? Even if there is a negative external effect on a 
third party, it is still possible that the exclusive dealing contract gives rise to efficiencies that 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects. The competition authority should intervene only if this 
possibility can be ruled out. 
 
 
Section 6:  Predatory Pricing 
 
a) Potential anticompetitive effects 
 
Predatory pricing is a strategy that consists of two phases: a predatory phase and a 
recoupment phase. During the predatory phase a dominant firm engages in a price reduction, 
which is profitable only because it eliminates or sufficiently weakens the competitive conduct 
of the firm’s rival(s) or potential rival(s) during the recoupment phase. Thus, predatory 
behavior is characterized by a phase of short-term price reduction succeeded by a phase 
during which the predator, equipped with sufficiently strong market power, can raise prices so 
as to increase long-run profits once competition is eliminated or sufficiently weakened. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, we can distinguish at least three types of strategic models of 
predatory pricing: (1) predation associated with imperfections in the financial markets; (2) 
signaling models; and (3) reputation models.  
 
b) Pro-competitive effects and efficiency considerations 
 
In general, predatory pricing poses a challenge of intrinsic difficulty to the antitrust 
authorities, because the challenged practice is that of a low price during the predatory phase. 
But at a general level the objective of antitrust is precisely to promote competitive prices. 
Furthermore, the Chicago critique seriously questioned whether predatory pricing could 
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emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon consistent with rational behavior on behalf of firms. 
For example, the deep pocket theory underlying financial predation was challenged by 
arguments according to which a perfectly competitive capital market would finance a 
financially constrained prey, and thereby eliminate the future returns from the incumbent’s 
investments into predation. However, as subsequent developments in industrial organization 
have established, capital market imperfections would constitute circumstances for perfectly 
rational financial predation.   
 
Overall, the challenge for the design of antitrust policy against predation is related to the 
ability of the antitrust authority to separate a price that is low for predatory purposes from a 
price that might be set very low as part of an efficiency-enhancing competitive process. For 
example, if there are switching costs, network effects, product complementarities or learning 
effects it could be perfectly legitimate and consistent with healthy competition that firms set 
very low prices when they are introducing new products, when they are targeting new 
customer segments or rivals’ installed bases, or when they are in the first phase of the learning 
curve. Thus, the competition authority with limited knowledge of industry- and firm-specific 
data faces a complex problem when attempting to identify those circumstances under which 
loss-inducing predatory prices cause harm to competition. For that reason the antitrust 
authorities have to be fully aware of the risks of misclassification when approaching a 
predation case.  
 
c) Implementation: An example 
 
We now apply the effects-based approach to predatory pricing cases. As for the other 
practices, the first priority should be to identify the nature of the exclusionary effect that is 
considered. Chapter II discussed several alternative scenarios; for the sake of exposition, we 
will focus here on test market predation based on signal jamming. 
 
Consider a firm that reflects on whether to enter a given market, and assume that there is 
substantial uncertainty regarding the profitability of entry. Rather than to commit itself to a 
highly risky entry decision this firm, the prey, acquires information by entering a test market, 
i.e. a limited product or geographic market, with the idea of learning the demand so as to be 
able to assess whether full-scale entry is profitable or not. The incumbent firm, the predator, 
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responds to this entry, or threat thereof, by lowering its price in the test market in order to 
prevent the prey from learning about demand under normal competitive conditions. The 
predator’s price in the test market, however, differs from its price conduct in other markets 
where the predator only faces established competition.  
 
In contrast to financial predation, test market predation based on signal jamming does not 
necessarily require any informational asymmetry between the prey and outside investors, or 
any other source of credit market imperfection. The crucial feature is that the predator jams 
market signals in such a way that the prey is unable to form a reliable estimate of demand. 
Such signal jamming may lead to complete entry deterrence or delayed entry and thus harm 
competition in that way. Proof of test market predation therefore essentially requires evidence 
that the predatory price reduction prevents the prey from learning about demand under normal 
competitive conditions, without restricting the instruments available to the entrant for 
information acquisition.39   
 
In particular, the recoupment ability of the predator has to be carefully assessed. The antitrust 
authority must explain why the prey’s exit or deterred entry causes persistent competitive 
harm. In order to convincingly establish test market predation based on signal jamming, 
alternative channels of acquiring information must be unavailable, significantly more 
expensive or less accurate: if competitive alternative channels of information acquisition are 
unavailable, predatory test market pricing would constitute a strategic entry barrier that could 
exclude rivals from the market in a persistent way and thereby harm competition; if instead 
signal jamming strategies fail to exclude other firms under similar market conditions the 
predator would not be able to recoup and the conditions of persistent competitive harm would 
not be satisfied.  
 
Overall sensible policy recommendations regarding predation should require that the antitrust 
authority is able to prove by reference to convincing evidence that the critical assumptions of 
a well-defined strategic model of predation are satisfied and that the conduct of the predator is 
consistent with that theory. In this report we have characterized sets of critical assumptions 
                                                 
39 Bolton, Broadley and Riordan (2000) present a detailed application of the effects-based approach to such test 
market predation in a case involving entry into the coffee market in Eastern USA in the 1970’s. In this market 
General Foods engaged in substantial price cuts in particular test market areas, which the entrant, Procter & 
Gamble, had selected in order to elucidate the demand for the coffee brand (Folgers) it wanted to introduce in 
Eastern USA. 
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for predation to potentially offer a consistent and credible story of competitive harm in the 
cases of predation based on signal jamming (this section) or based on capital market 
imperfections (Section II.1). In both cases, identifying the nature of the concern (a consistent 
“predation story”) allows the antitrust authority to spell out the key facts that need to be 
established, such as the need for the prey to acquire market information or to attract outside 
investors.40 It can be noted that these key facts had little to do with the predator’s cost; rather, 
they concerned the target’s ability to get access to finance or reliable information. Thus, the 
price-cost rules currently used in EU case law do not necessarily provide convincing evidence 
that the critical facts of a sound predation story are present. Finally, it is up to the antitrust 
authority to make certain that these key facts are indeed present. If it has done so and if the 
evidence of predatory pricing is sufficiently strong, the burden of proof for a convincing 
efficiency defense of its conduct should switch to the defendant.  
 
                                                 
40 As these two forms of predation make clear, the nature of the facts that need to be established indeed critically 
depends on the predation story involved. 
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